TEHRAN - Bahia Halawi, the deputy general manager at Al-Mayadeen, believe that direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel with the mediation of the U.S. cannot guarantee Lebanon’s long-term security as Israel maintains occupation, pressure, and repeated violations of ceasefire.

“When one side continues military operations while simultaneously demanding political concessions, the process risks becoming coercive rather than genuinely diplomatic,” Halawi tells the Tehran Times.

She says, “Lebanon’s long-term security depends not only on talks, but on enforceable guarantees.” 

Recently, the U.S. has hosted two rounds of ambassador-level talks between Israel and Lebanon, with a third round scheduled for May 14–15 in Washington.  The first round took place on April 14, and the second on April 23. Both were held in Washington and involved the U.S. facilitating direct discussions between the two countries.

Halawi says the U.S., which is Israel’s closest ally, cannot serve as a neutral mediator, saying Washington “fails to address the structural causes of instability or to establish a genuinely balanced framework rooted in international law, sovereignty, and equal accountability.”

The following is the full text of the interview:

In your assessment, how have Western and mainstream international media framed the recent Israeli attacks on Lebanon, particularly those that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians? What key elements of the story do you believe are underreported or systematically omitted?

Western and mainstream international media often frame Israeli attacks on Lebanon through a security-first lens: Israel “responds,” “targets Hezbollah,” or “acts against threats,” while Lebanese civilian deaths appear as secondary consequences rather than the central story, often portrayed merely as collateral damage. It is also important to note the repeated emphasis on Israeli military “warnings” and “alerts,” even though many attacks affecting civilians occurred without meaningful or effective warning mechanisms.

This framing tends to underreport the human scale of the attacks, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the repeated displacement of communities, and the continuation of strikes even after ceasefire announcements. The overall coverage frequently fails to convey the scale of destruction taking place on the ground, reducing widespread devastation to fragmented security updates. Add to that the terminology and language used when reporting on Lebanese victims. The framing adopted by much of the Western and international media often follows the same formula: “two Lebanese killed,” “a score of casualties,” or “several dead.” But killed by whom? Who carried out these actions? Why is the perpetrator so often absent from the headline, forcing readers to dig into the second or third line of the piece to discover that it was Israel?

Yet when the situation is reversed, the language suddenly becomes direct and explicit. This discrepancy is neither arbitrary nor accidental. This is a deliberate editorial framing to shape how audiences perceive whose lives are considered politically or emotionally significant. We don't get to read stories about Lebanese casualties. Their lives are not viewed as worthy. There is also a systematic omission of the broader context: the history of Israeli violations, the asymmetry of military power, the long-term impact on Lebanese society, and the legal and ethical questions surrounding proportionality and collective punishment. 

In addition, there is a historical and cultural dimension that receives very little attention internationally, particularly regarding repeated attacks on southern Lebanese towns with deep Christian historical and religious significance. Churches, monasteries, shrines, cemeteries, and family homes in these regions are tied to generations of collective identity and spiritual life, clearly absent in the Western media.

The killing of Lebanese journalist Amal Khalil has drawn attention to the risks faced by media professionals in conflict zones. Based on your experience, does this incident reflect a broader pattern of targeting journalists, or is it treated internationally as an isolated case?

Israel has been systematically targeting journalists and media outlets in Lebanon and Palestine, thus the killing of Amal Khalil should not be treated as an isolated tragedy. Journalists covering Israeli military actions are exposed not only to the dangers of Israeli aggression but also to direct and deliberate targeting. Reports stated that Amal Khalil’s killing was a “double-tap” strike, while press freedom organizations highlighted her long record of field reporting from southern Lebanon.

Internationally, however, such cases are often individualized: one journalist, one incident, one investigation. This fragmented treatment prevents the broader pattern from being fully acknowledged. The real question is not only why Amal Khalil was killed, but why journalists in Lebanon and Gaza repeatedly become part of the battlefield itself.

At Al Mayadeen, we have experienced this reality first-hand. We lost colleagues who were carrying out their journalistic duty, including two young females, Farah Omar and Fatima Ftouni, who were killed by Israel while reporting from southern Lebanon.

We also witnessed the injury and targeting of other journalists in the field. These are not isolated episodes detached from one another; they point to an environment in which the protections theoretically granted to journalists in conflict zones are repeatedly failing in practice whenever we are dealing with Israel.

What becomes especially dangerous is the normalization of this reality. When the killing of journalists generates temporary outrage but little accountability, it creates a new reality where media workers operating in these regions can be targeted without meaningful consequences.

There have been previous documented cases of journalists being killed in Israeli strikes in Lebanon. How do you assess the level of accountability in such cases?

Accountability has been extremely weak. The case of Reuters journalist Issam Abdallah is a clear example. Human Rights Watch said the Israeli strike that killed him and wounded six other journalists was a deliberate attack on civilians and therefore a war crime; UNIFIL also found that an Israeli tank fired at clearly identifiable journalists. 

Yet, despite investigations by Reuters, Amnesty, HRW, and press freedom groups, there has been no meaningful accountability. Even U.S. lawmakers later stated that Israel had not held anyone accountable for the 2023 strike. 

 Despite ceasefire announcements, Israeli strikes have continued. How do you interpret this coexistence of diplomacy and escalation from a media and strategic communication perspective?

The coexistence of ceasefire language and continued strikes is not a contradiction; it is part of the strategy. Diplomacy becomes the language of de-escalation, while military action continues to shape the facts on the ground. From a media perspective, this creates a dual narrative: officials speak of calm, negotiations, and security arrangements, while civilians experience bombardment, displacement, and fear.

Strategically, it allows Israel to maintain military pressure while benefiting from the political legitimacy of mediation. The ceasefire then becomes not a full halt to violence, but a framework within which selective violence is normalized. 

We have already seen this pattern in Gaza, so none of this is new. Yes, there may be a so-called “ceasefire,” but the killing, famine, displacement, and destruction continue. The reality on the ground did not suddenly change simply because the headlines did. What changed most is the media attention and the language used to describe what is happening. As international focus faded, the coverage became less urgent and more detached, even though the suffering remains. Terms that once reflected the scale of the catastrophe were gradually replaced with softer, more bureaucratic language. 

Do you believe that direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel can realistically contribute to ensuring Lebanon’s long-term security, particularly in light of ongoing military tensions?

Direct negotiations cannot guarantee Lebanon’s long-term security if they take place under conditions of ongoing fire, occupation, pressure, and repeated violations. Negotiation, in principle, can be a tool of stabilization. But when one side continues military operations while simultaneously demanding political concessions, the process risks becoming coercive rather than genuinely diplomatic.

Lebanon’s long-term security depends not only on talks, but on enforceable guarantees: respect for sovereignty, an end to violations, protection of civilians, and credible accountability mechanisms. Without these conditions, negotiations may temporarily manage the crisis — or create the impression of stability — but they will not address the structural roots of insecurity.

In the Lebanese case specifically, it becomes even more critical to consolidate and make use of every available domestic point of strength before entering any negotiation process, whether political, institutional, social, or strategic.

Internal fragmentation has historically been one of the main vulnerabilities that external actors attempt to exploit. Therefore, Lebanon must work preemptively to block any internal divisions, proxy dynamics, or pressure points that counterparties could use to drag the country into a weaker negotiating position or impose arrangements that do not reflect genuine sovereignty or long-term national interests.

How do you assess the role of the United States as a mediator between Lebanon and Israel? In your view, to what extent is this mediation genuine and effective?

The United States presents itself as a mediator, but its credibility is inevitably shaped and limited by its longstanding strategic and historical alignment with Israel. Washington clearly possesses significant leverage and the ability to pressure Israel when it chooses to do so. However, this leverage is rarely exercised in a sustained, balanced, or unconditional manner, particularly when it comes to restraining escalation or enforcing accountability without broader strategic calculations or political returns.

So the issue is not whether the United States has influence. It clearly does. The deeper question is how that influence is deployed and toward what objectives. In many instances, U.S. mediation appears less like neutral conflict resolution and more like a form of crisis management aimed at containing escalation while preserving Israel’s strategic freedom of maneuver.

This is why many in the region perceive American mediation as reactive rather than transformative. It often succeeds in managing moments of tension, shaping diplomatic optics, or preventing total collapse, but it fails to address the structural causes of instability or to establish a genuinely balanced framework rooted in international law, sovereignty, and equal accountability.

Another important issue to point out is the role of the United States in supplying Israel with the weapons, military aid, intelligence support, and funding that allow it to sustain its military operations. How can a party genuinely mediate a conflict while simultaneously arming and politically backing one side throughout it?

A mediator, in principle, is expected to maintain some degree of balance and impartiality. Yet the U.S. has consistently positioned itself as Israel’s closest ally, not only militarily but also diplomatically. Time and again, Washington has used its veto power at the UN Security Council to shield Israel from international accountability, block resolutions calling for meaningful action, or dilute criticism directed at Israeli policies and military conduct.

Because of this, many people in the region do not view the U.S. role as true mediation, but rather as political management of the conflict in a way that protects Israeli interests first and foremost. At times, there may be public calls for “restraint” or symbolic criticism directed at Israel, but these rarely translate into concrete pressure, consequences, or real measures capable of changing the situation on the ground.

How do you interpret the U.S.–Israel relationship in ongoing regional conflicts, and is it driven more by Israeli influence on U.S. policy or by Israel serving as a strategic instrument of American foreign policy?

The U.S.-Israel relationship is not a simple one-way relationship. It is neither a case of Israel fully dictating U.S. policy, nor one in which Israel acts merely as a passive instrument of Washington. Rather, it is a deeply entrenched strategic partnership shaped by overlapping geopolitical interests, domestic political dynamics, military-industrial ties, intelligence sharing, and longstanding ideological commitments. In many cases, the way this relationship is projected internationally reflects coordination and orchestration rather than purely spontaneous alignment or reactive policymaking.

Israel often functions as a forward strategic asset for U.S. influence in the region.
At the same time, successive Israeli governments have demonstrably influenced U.S. regional policy through lobbying networks, political pressure, intelligence framing, and the creation of faits accomplis that later become incorporated into broader American calculations. At the same time, when the United States itself becomes directly involved in wars or large-scale regional escalation, priorities can become more nuanced. While the starting point may be mutual strategic benefit, the consequences of conflict — economically, politically, militarily, and socially — also affect both countries differently just like we are witnessing in the context of the war on Iran. Domestic considerations inside each state then begin influencing how policymakers manage escalation, absorb costs, or redefine objectives.

This should not necessarily be interpreted as a rupture or divergence between the two allies, but rather as each side attempting to manage the implications of conflict according to its own national interests and internal pressures. The domestic factor is becoming increasingly important, particularly within the United States itself after the genocide in Gaza.

One of the most significant long-term shifts today is generational. Among younger Americans — especially Gen Z and segments of younger voters — we are witnessing a noticeable transformation in sentiment regarding Israel, U.S. foreign policy, and military involvement in the region. Public opinion trends increasingly show skepticism toward unconditional support, greater emphasis on human rights discourse, and stronger “America First” domestic priorities.

This matters strategically because today’s younger voters are tomorrow’s policymakers, legislators, journalists, and opinion-makers. Over time, these shifts may not dismantle the U.S.-Israel alliance, but they could reshape the terms under which it operates, introducing greater pressure inside the United States to prioritize American domestic interests and costs over open-ended regional commitments or “Israel First” strategic calculations.